









In mixed methods approaches, statistical models are used to identify
“nested” cases for intensive, small-n investigation for a range of purposes,
including notably the examination of causal mechanisms. This article shows
that under a commonsense interpretation of causal effects, large-n models
allow no reliable conclusions about effect sizes in individual cases—even if we
choose “onlier” cases as is usually suggested. Contrary to established
practice, we show that choosing “reinforcing” outlier cases—where out-
comes are stronger than predicted in the statistical model—is appropriate
for testing preexisting hypotheses on causal mechanisms, as this reduces the
risk of false negatives. When investigating mechanisms inductively,
researchers face a choice between “onlier” and reinforcing outlier cases that
represents a trade-off between false negatives and false positives. We
demonstrate that the inferential power of nested research designs can be
much increased through paired comparisons of cases. More generally, this
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article provides a new conceptual framework for understanding the limits to
and conditions for causal generalization from case studies.
Keywords
mixed methods, nested research design, case choice, residual, outlier, pro-
cess tracing, case study, generalization from case studies, causal mechanisms
The literature on “mixed methods” in political science continues to expand
and has developed a growing practical tool kit for combining research on the
“large-n” and “small-n” levels. Yet a key epistemological tension remains
unresolved in this approach: On the one hand, the statistical part of mixed
methods adopts a stochastic worldview which, following the widely accepted
“potential outcomes” framework, treats causal effects in individual cases as
unknowable. On the other hand, mixed methods scholars aim to pick indi-
vidual case studies in a way that allows them to generalize from these cases
to larger populations, be it to identify omitted variables, assess measurement
error, or to establish causal mechanisms that undergird the effects observed
in larger samples (Gerring 2007a; Gerring and Cojocaru 2016; Lieberman
2005).
This article shows that due to this tension, standard mixed methods
approaches promise more in terms of identifying the “right” cases than they
can deliver. This is largely due to the discrepancy between the random
components of large-n analysis (LNA; to follow the terminology of Lieber-
man 2005) and the need for case-specific point predictions to identify the
right cases for small-n analysis (SNA). We show that under a commonsense
interpretation of causality, statistical models allow us no reliable conclusions
about the strength or presence of causal effects in individual cases. This
means that there is a fundamental limitation to generalization from case
studies, whether they are embedded in a mixed methods research design or
chosen otherwise: Causal patterns can vary idiosyncratically across individ-
ual cases even if they are broadly shared across a larger population.
These broader inferential challenges are illustrated through a discussion
of standard case choice prescriptions for the investigation of causal mechan-
isms. We notably show that recommendations to choose “typical” or “onlier”
cases do not guarantee representativeness in terms of causal effects. The
potential inferential mistakes resulting from this include false negatives (or
type II errors), when a causal process is absent or weak in a specific case, a
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finding that is then wrongly generalized to the wider population. Especially
when a case study does not test specific ex ante hypotheses, it can also
generate false positives (or type I errors), when a causal mechanism is (cor-
rectly) identified in the case at hand, but its presence is wrongly attributed to
the wider population.
Contrary to established practice, we show that choosing reinforcing out-
lier cases—where an outcome is stronger than predicted in the LNA—is
appropriate for testing preexisting hypotheses on causal mechanisms, as it
reduces (though does not eliminate) the risk of false negatives. We also argue
that when causal mechanisms are investigated inductively, researchers face a
choice between “onlier” and reinforcing outlier cases that represents a trade-
off between false negatives and false positives. We demonstrate that the
inferential power of nested research designs can be much increased through
paired comparisons of nested cases, especially if our theory about the causal
process allows us to choose contrasting outliers.
We also show that similar rules apply for research designs aiming to
identify mechanisms that account for reverse causality, which however
should focus on “attenuating” outliers, that is, cases with weaker than pre-
dicted outcomes. Finally, while existing prescriptions to use outlier cases to
investigate measurement error and (nonconfounding) omitted variables are
basically correct, generalizing conclusions from single case studies on such
issues need to be treated with caution. The same applies to the choice of
“high leverage” cases for the identification of unobserved confounders.
This article first reviews standard prescriptions for model-led case choice
in the mixed methods literature. It then investigates the implicit assumptions
about causal effects in individual cases that this literature makes. Reanalyz-
ing statistical models from published studies as well as from Monte Carole
simulations, it shows that LNA research allows us no reliable conclusions
about causal effects in individual cases. It outlines rules for minimizing the
inferential risks this uncertainty creates and shows that its arguments and
rules work for a variety of LNA modeling approaches and are relevant for a
wide range of inferential objectives in case study research.
Literature Review
While the immediate function of case study research is the production of
internally valid inferences, much of the social sciences continues to use them
for the investigation of generalizable patterns (Elman, Gerring, and Mahoney
2016; Herron and Quinn 2016; Lieberman 2005). The grounds for choosing
cases for generalization in older methods literature are relatively hazy,
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focusing on qualitative judgments of specific cases as “least likely” or “most
likely” environments for testing a given hypothesis (Eckstein 1975). During the
last two decades or so, methodologists have developed more formal, quantita-
tive methods for choosing cases for potential generalizability. The nesting of a
small number of case studies within large-n research designs has become one
particularly prominent approach (Howard and Roessler 2006; Lieberman 2009;
Reiter 1996; Seymour 2014; Smith 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005).
The purposes underlying formalized, nested case choice include the detec-
tion of measurement error, investigation of causal heterogeneity and scope
conditions, identification of omitted variables, and sometimes, ambitiously,
the estimation of causal effect sizes (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016; Herron and
Quinn 2016; Seawright 2016b). Finally, most prominently, formal case
choice is used to identify cases best suited for the investigation of causal
mechanisms that underlie the effects established in large-n models (Barnes
and Weller 2014; Gerring 2007b; Lieberman 2005; Seawright 2016b).
Selection rules differ by purpose: Deviant cases (i.e., ones badly explained
by the large-n model) are used for identifying measurement error as well as to
detect hitherto unobserved (but ideally generalizable) causal variables and
processes that can then be incorporated into a revised large-n model or
experimental design (Gerring and Cojocaru 2016; Seawright 2016a).
Onliers or “typical” cases, by contrast, are occasionally recommended for
estimating causal effect sizes (Herron and Quinn 2016), but mostly to inves-
tigate causal mechanisms, usually through some variant of within-case
“process tracing” (Brady and Collier 2010; George and Bennett 2005; Lie-
berman 2005).1 For such typical case choice, we are also usually held to pick
cases in which the model expects an independent variable to produce a
particularly strong effect (Barnes and Weller 2014; Lieberman 2005; Sea-
wright 2016a). Although the literature typically uses examples from obser-
vational LNA, the logic of nested case choice can also be applied to
experimental methods (Seawright 2016b).
Seawright (2016b) has recently argued, against existing literature, that
choosing deviant or outlier cases can also make the detection of a causal
process linking already observed causal and outcome variables more likely.
His argument, related to but distinct from the ones in this article, will be
discussed in more detail below.
Existing Critiques of Nested Research Designs
Mixed methods and nested research designs more specifically have been
criticized from several perspectives. Some scholars have argued that there
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is a fundamental incompatibility between large-n and case-oriented research
due to different assumptions about generalizability (Bennett and Elman
2006) and different types of questions asked and models of causation
assumed (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). This article will assume that such
issues can be overcome through careful theoretical specification and integra-
tion of the research design.
Another critique of nested research is closer to the arguments in this
article: That biased or incomplete specification of the LNA model can lead
to the incorrect identification of individual cases as onliers or outliers, lead-
ing to an SNA with a wrong and potentially misleading focus (Rohlfing
2008). To this, we would add that there is an unresolved discussion over
what makes a “good” model (Achen 2005). At a minimum, which factors
should be included in an LNA model will depend on the changing state of our
theories.
This uncertainty over specifying the right model is compounded by an
issue discussed in the following section: The fact that even if we have a
model correctly describing the average causal effects in a given sample, we
cannot be sure that in all individual cases, the causal effects of the identified
independent variables are of the magnitude predicted by the model. While
this issue is most easily illustrated with LNA-led case choice, it complicates
causal generalization through case studies more generally, thereby raising
fundamental concerns for qualitative work also beyond mixed methods
approaches.
Rethinking Case Study-Based Generalization under
Causal Heterogeneity
Most statistical models in political science cannot make reliable point pre-
dictions about causal effects in individual cases, even if the model itself is
estimated with a high degree of precision, that is, when the standard errors of
its coefficients are small. Experimental research designs acknowledge this by
explicitly focusing on the average treatment effect (ATE), that is, without
inferring the impact that a treatment has had on individual observations, the
nontreatment counterfactual of which is always unobservable (Holland
1986). Experimentalists can, at best, identify group-level heterogeneity of
treatment effects (Imai and Ratkovic 2013). The same is, of course, true of
observational studies (Rubin 2005) but not sufficiently recognized in much
of the mixed methods literature (see Seawright 2016a, for an exception).2
The difference between group-level average effects and individual effects
is captured intuitively by the distinction between a statistical model’s
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confidence interval and its prediction interval. Even models with tight con-
fidence intervals usually have wide prediction intervals, meaning they cannot
predict outcomes for individual observation with any precision. We illustrate
this point in Online Appendix Section 1 (which can be found at http://smr.
sagepub.com/supplemental/) with Monte Carlo data and replicating two pro-
minent pieces of research. If effects for individual observations vary, how-
ever, then the underlying mechanisms producing these effects can be
assumed to vary too (see the next section for a more detailed discussion of
the link between effects and mechanisms).
Advocates of “nested” research designs have a reply to this: That when
choosing individual cases from a larger population, we do typically know
their individual outcome score and the error/residual. We do not sample them
randomly (unless we follow the prescription of Fearon and Laitin 2008). This
allows us to deliberately choose cases that are “typical,” that is, “onlier”
cases with small residuals. In typical cases, the causal process (or mechan-
ism) connecting X and Y is expected to be more likely to be present in some
representative fashion and observable through process tracing (Gerring
2007a; Lieberman 2005).
In this interpretation, the error term captures the unobserved variables and
stochastic forces that work to “push” a case off the regression surface. The
remaining difference to the population mean is explained with the systematic
factors captured through independent variables and their coefficients. Criti-
cally, however, a given independent variable’s effect on the outcome in an
individual case is inferred from the model, which estimates the slope of the
particular X–Y link in question. It is not directly observed.
This is not a problem if we assume that causal effects of our independent
variables are invariant across individual cases—that is, that these effects do
not only average out in the larger LNA sample, but that given specific values
of the independent variable, they exert the exact same influence on the
dependent variable in all cases. Under this assumption, all remaining
deviance from the model is indeed explained with unrelated, case-specific
errors that have nothing to do with the effect of our independent variable.
We can call this the assumption of perfect causal homogeneity. It is
distinct from the typical assumption of causal homogeneity which merely
posits that the same causal regularities are at work across a given sample,
without implying that they will work always out at the same predicted effect
sizes for all cases. As mentioned above, experimental research designs
focusing on the ATE explicitly avoid the assumption of perfect homogeneity.
As example, let us consider the oft-cited Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004)
regression model predicting civil war onset as a function of various structural
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variables, including commodity exports, population size, and gross domestic
product (GDP) growth (replicated in Online Appendix Section 1, which can
be found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/). Perfect causal homoge-
neity would mean that in all individual country cases in their sample, an
increase in GDP growth in the preceding five-year period by 1 percent would
yield exactly the same decrease in the odds of conflict.
Perfect causal homogeneity cannot be directly proven. It has an interest-
ing implication for methods of “nested” case choice, however: It is not clear
how choosing “onlier” cases with a small error term helps in identifying
“typical” cases—we assume, after all, that within our case, universe causal
effects are constant and homogenous. Cases with large residuals simply are
subject to larger residual error processes that have nothing to do with the
causal effect we are interested in, which should still be at work with the same
force as in all other cases. As a result, we can in principle observe the same
underlying causal processes across all cases. To go back to the Collier and
Hoeffler example, perhaps prudent leadership was an idiosyncratic contri-
butor to the error term that saved a given country with negative GDP growth
rates from civil war, but war was still objectively more likely to a certain,
fixed extent because of the economic shock.
Some authors do indeed discount the recommendation to select “onliers”
and simply choose cases where the independent variable of interest is likely
to have a particularly large impact according to the LNA model. Teorell
(2010) in his study of global democratization takes this approach and expli-
citly pays no heed to his cases’ residual (p. 184). Barnes and Weller (2014)
similarly recommend to focus on cases where the addition of a given inde-
pendent variable in a statistical model leads to a maximum reduction (but not
a minimization) of the residual. But is this a defensible approach?
What If Causal Effects Vary from Case to Case?
Under perfect causal homogeneity, residuals do not matter. By focusing on
onliers rather than simply high-impact cases, authors like Gerring and Lie-
berman seem to implicitly assume that we cannot take such homogeneity for
granted. This article will argue that this is a reasonable, conservative posi-
tion, based on standard assumptions of the potential outcomes framework.
Both Gerring (2007a:147) and Lieberman (2005:448) are aware that sta-
tistically representative cases are not necessarily theoretically representative
and that their small residual can be caused by unobserved factors (be they
unobserved variables or simple stochastic fluctuation). This implies that the
residual measured in the statistical model does not capture all case-specific
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idiosyncrasies. This however can only be the case if the causal effects esti-
mated in the rest of the model themselves vary: If they were constant and
deterministic across all cases, the residual would always pick up all unre-
lated, nonmeasured factors.
The implicit assumption that causal effects are not homogenous across
cases seems intuitively plausible if we consider how we think about case-
level causal mechanisms in research practice. Take the relationship between
years of schooling and countries’ economic growth as an example (Barro
2001). It is obvious that perfect causal homogeneity is unlikely.
We can easily imagine unsystematic, case-specific ways in which the
impact of schooling on economic activity itself could vary and which no
general LNA model can capture: Perhaps a country has strong and productive
traditions of artisanship that are undermined through academic training; or
perhaps important parts of society—such as ethnic minorities—might per-
ceive state policies to increase years of schooling as unwelcome intervention,
resulting in longer but ineffective schooling. More generally, the effect of
years of schooling is likely to just be subject to irreducible stochastic varia-
tion across cases.
As important, there are likely to be systematic, that is, generalizable, ways
in which unobserved variables interact with schooling to affect the level of
economic activity: Some countries will have underdeveloped labor markets
that cannot absorb qualified workers; in others, higher levels of education
might lead to political mobilization and unrest that undermine growth.
Schooling will have different effects depending on circumstances. Such
interaction effects, if present in at least some parts of the sample, could in
principle be modeled in the LNA, but in practice, exhaustive modeling of
such systematic treatment heterogeneity is impossible.
If unobserved factors that modulate treatment effects are not systemati-
cally correlated with any of the observed independent variables, this does not
necessarily bias the LNA model, as their effects average out. They will
however affect case-level causal effects. As a result, the causal mechanisms
underlying these effects, while broadly present in the general population,
could be weak or inoperative in specific cases (see Pearl 2009, for a discus-
sion of the link between causal effects and mechanisms).
This means that at least some of the case residuals in a model might be
explained by case-level variation in the causal effects themselves rather than
by unrelated errors. This is indeed a foundational assumption of the potential
outcomes framework, where treatment effects are assumed to vary across
individual cases and causal heterogeneity can be modeled at best for larger
groups of cases (Holland 1986; Imai and Ratkovic 2013).
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To capture this issue theoretically, we propose a distinction between
causal process error (CPE), that is, cross-case variation in the effect size
of a given independent variable, and background error, that is, variation in
outcomes created by unrelated processes that influence the dependent vari-
able and are not captured in the model. CPE and background error together
constitute the residual of any individual observation.
In the language of the potential outcomes framework, the CPE captures
treatment heterogeneity across individual observations. In biomedical statis-
tics, the phenomenon is also known as “subject-treatment interaction” (Poul-
son, Gadbury, and Allison 2012), a phenomenon that the fundamental
problem of causal inference prevents us from directly measuring. The back-
ground error, in turn, is best thought of as a combination of the effects of
unobserved variables and of pure stochastic noise on the outcome variable. It
operates separately from the core causal effect we are interested in.
To go back to the example on education and growth, there could be a
negative CPE that reduces the direct effect of education on growth in one
particular case because formal education leads to a decline of productive
artisanal traditions in that country. A background error could be any other
unrelated (and unmeasured) case-specific factor pushing growth up or down
that is independent of education, perhaps the quality of leadership or weather
conditions.
How does this relate to causal mechanisms? The background error does
not affect the operation of any causal mechanism between X and Y. Assuming
a CPE, however, means that the effect of X on Y itself varies from case to
case, and with it the operation of the mechanism(s) producing the effect. As
the CPE reflects a larger or smaller effect, this in turn can be assumed to
mean that the mechanism(s) underlying the link are operating at varying
levels of strength and are potentially absent in some cases. This critically
affects how easily observable the mechanisms will be through within-case
process tracing.
Allowing for CPEs means that case-study-based generalizations about
broader causal patterns and mechanisms is difficult for all types of case
studies, no matter how chosen—whether as “onliers,” randomly sampled
(Fearon and Laitin 2008), chosen for how a given variable reduces a case’s
residual (Teorell 2010), or simply selected according to qualitative criteria
without a nested research design. In any case study, mechanisms that are
generally present in a wider population could be weak or absent in our case
due to an idiosyncratic CPE. Conversely, we might overgeneralize about
mechanisms we have identified in our case which are, in fact, unusual and
unrepresentative in at least three ways: First, the stochastic dimension of the
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CPE might have boosted it unusually while it is absent or less strong in other
cases. Secondly, a case-specific interaction could have boosted the effect at
hand and we incorrectly generalize that the interaction is part of a more
widely present mechanism. Thirdly, we might overlook the interaction,
thereby overgeneralizing about the mechanism itself, which is weaker or
absent in other cases without the interaction. There is no general guidance
on how to deal with this issue beyond taking caution with any case-based
generalization and paying extra attention to case context factors that could
modulate the functioning of a mechanism.
We should mention that this interpretation of causal mechanisms remains
in a frequentist, stochastic framework that corresponds to a linear, additive
model of causality in which many variables and all probabilities are mea-
sured in continuous terms and in which there are unexplained residuals. This
is not easily compatible with a prominent approach to qualitative case
research in which causal relationships are expressed in terms of necessary
and sufficient conditions, in which causal accounts are meant to be exhaus-
tive and in which, given a set causal conditions, there is no clear place for
different effect sizes (Goertz and Mahoney 2012; Schneider and Rohlfing
2013).
This is a tension that all nested research designs that depart from a sta-
tistical model face. The nature of case study research and process tracing in
such nested designs will therefore have to be different from qualitative
approaches focused on exhaustive constellations of causes: Instead of aiming
at a complete account of the causal pattern that led to a specific outcome, it
will primarily aim to identify one pathway that contributed to an outcome,
potentially on the margin. Closely related, it will depart from the cause rather
than the effect. The nested approach departing from statistical models is
therefore mostly suited for generalizing, “effect of causes” research. It is
harder to imagine nested statistical models to be integrated with an exhaus-
tive “causes of effects” approach.3
In the approach discussed here, the statistical model comes first and we
allow for unexplained (and potentially unexplainable) treatment heterogene-
ity of individual observations in the shape of CPEs. This has a key implica-
tion for nested research designs: Different from the assumption of perfect
causal homogeneity, the presence of CPEs does in fact allow us to justify the
choice of onliers as typical cases. Consider that the background error by
definition is not correlated with the CPE, and an observation’s residual is
a combination of the two. They can offset each other, which will typically
result in a smaller residual, or can add up, which will tend to generate a larger
residual. The further away a case lies from the regression surface, the more
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likely it is to have large causal process and background errors that work in the
same direction. This means that for such cases, CPEs will on average be
biased in one direction and, critically, be larger than for onlier cases, where
their sample average is zero and their individual values (positive or negative)
will be smaller.
In the education-growth example, cases with a “typical” growth outcome
are more likely to have both a smaller CPE of the education effect and a
smaller background error, therefore making it more likely that the case-level
effect of education on growth is closer to what the model predicts. For an
“attenuating” outlier with a smaller than predicted growth outcome, by con-
trast, it is likely that unrelated background error processes have helped to
push growth down, but size of the education effect itself is also more likely to
be below average and thereby unrepresentative.
In this sense, onlier cases are indeed more likely to be “typical,” that is, to
be subject to individual CPEs that are smaller and cluster around zero. By
choosing onliers, we can reduce the risk of idiosyncratic cases in which the
causal effect of interest is not unusually weak, strong, or absent. But how
good of an insurance is this? We use a simple Monte Carole simulation of a
bivariate correlation to test this.
We first investigate the absolute CPEs for onliers as compared to outliers
of different magnitudes. We then specifically assess the types of cases where
attenuating CPEs tend to arise that reduce or completely remove causal
effects, hence creating a risk of false negatives: that is, the mechanism(s)
linking X to Y are not detected in a specific case although they are present in
the general population. This is followed by a discussion of the types of cases
that are likely to create false positives—that is, the identification of causal
processes that are not generalizable beyond the case at hand. The discussion
focuses on research designs used for the detection of causal mechanisms; the
principles emerging from it are then used to assess case choice rules for other
research purposes.
A Simulation of Causal Process Errors
The data generation model chosen is arbitrary but helps to illustrate the
measurement issues at hand, namely, the range of causal process and back-
ground errors that can result from different case choice rules. We generate
10,000 observations on the basis of the formula y ¼ 1:5þ 1xþ e, with x
values ranging from 0 to 3 (see Online Appendix Section 1, which can be
found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/, for graphical illustrations of
the same model with fewer observations).
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The error/residual results from adding two individual, uncorrelated,
smaller error terms; one for the causal process and one for the background





, resulting in a standard
deviation of 1 for the total (summed) error. Each of the two error types hence
accounts, on average, for an equal amount of deviance from the systematic
component of the model. The simulation model’s R2 is .48, indicating that
despite the errors, our model captures a considerable share of the variation
across observations.
Note that the point here is the conceptual illustration of the problem; in
practice, CPEs are unobservable in quantitative models. Their importance in
a data generation process could be anything from quite small to accounting
for most of the error structure, thereby creating strong individual-level causal
heterogeneity making generalization even more difficult.
For the time being, we assume that there are distinct causal effects at both
extreme ends of the causal variable; an implicit assumption shared by much of
the nested case choice literature. For the education-growth example, this would
imply (reasonably) that both low and high education levels will have observable
effects on growth, created by identifiable causal mechanisms. For an alternative
scenario where causal effects are simply absent at one end of the causal vari-
able’s value range, see the below section on cross-case comparisons.
Using the above simulation data, what happens if we follow standard rules
for identifying “typical” cases for in-depth study of the causal process linking
X to Y? To recall, this requires cases with a small residual and where X is
expected to have a strong impact on Y. In our simple model, we would look for
such “leverage” in cases with low or high X, where the negative or positive
impact of X relative to the population mean would be particularly pronounced.
To assess the utility of choosing onlier cases, we compare the average size
of the absolute of CPEs for cases chosen according to four different selection
criteria:
 onliers, where the absolute of the case residual is less than half of its
standard deviation in the full sample (39 percent of cases);
 moderate outliers, where the absolute of the case residual lies between
half and a full standard deviation (30 percent of cases);
 distinct outliers, where it lies between 1 and 2 standard deviations (27
percent of cases);
 extreme outliers, where it lies above 2 standard deviations (4 percent
of cases);
 (due to the large n, these proportions of cases lie very close to a perfect
normal distribution of errors; note also that we assume here that the
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model is well-specified, i.e., there is no systematic measurement error
or omitted variable bias).
The box plots in Figure 1 show the distribution of CPEs for different case
categories (the boxes contain the central two quartiles of CPE values, while
the whiskers contain 95 percent). As we would expect, onliers do indeed have
the smallest average CPEs and the most compact distribution of CPEs. Yet
their advantage is small: Table 1 shows that the average CPE for onliers lies






outliers have average CPEs of 0.51. Only larger outliers have substantially
larger CPEs (see Online Appendix Section 2, Figure A.10, which can be
found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/, for a continuous curve fitted
to the relationship between residual and CPE). There hence appears no strong
reason to prefer onliers over moderate outliers if our objective is to minimize
CPEs and capture a causal process that is “representative” in its effect size.
Ceteris paribus, larger outliers should be avoided for this purpose.
Figure 1. Simulated absolute causal process errors by outlier status.
Table 1. Average of Absolute of Causal Process Errors.
Onliers Moderate Outliers Distinct Outliers Extreme Outliers
0.41 0.51 0.73 1.18
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More important, however, is that onliers also have substantial average
CPEs. To recall, the linear effects of X on Y in our model range from 1.5 to
þ1.5, so if we seek a case study that is representative in the effect size of the
X–Y causal process, sizable distortions are possible even for onliers, given
that their CPEs are also fairly widely dispersed, with 5 percent of onlier cases
having CPEs above 1. Onliers are not necessarily representative. In our
education-growth model, we might well end up choosing an onlier case with
an unusually large or small effect of education on growth.
Conditions for False Negatives
We have so far worried about positive and negative causal errors. What if our
concern is not unrepresentative causal effects in general, but only negative
biases: substantially diluted, absent, or even reversed causal effects, that is, false
negatives? The typical purpose of case studies is, after all, not the estimation of
effect sizes but rather the detection of theoretically relevant causal mechanisms
or pathways. If this is our aim, we should be more concerned about attenuated
causal processes producing small effects than about unusually strong ones.
Attenuated effects occur in cases where CPEs reduce the size of the
typical causal effect. This is more likely for cases that show a weaker effect
on Y than the model predicts, which we call attenuating outliers. In these
cases, at least some of their location below the regression surface will on
average, though not always, be explained with CPEs. As we now focus on the
direction of bias and not its absolute size, Figure 2 simply shows average
CPEs. They are generated under the same case selection rules as in Figure 1,
except that we only include cases with a negative residual, that is, where the
Y is smaller than predicted. As expected, attenuating CPEs on average
become larger the more negative the total residual is.
Unsurprisingly, for onliers with small negative residuals between zero and
half of a standard deviation, there is little systematic bias in the CPEs, whose
average, despite considerable dispersion, is 0.12. The systematic bias
becomes much larger for stronger outliers and converges on the average of
the absolute of CPEs for extreme outliers from Figure 1, as attenuating CPEs
constitute virtually all of the CPEs in these cases.
How frequent are cases in which CPEs substantially reduce causal
effects? The bottom three rows of Table 2 show the shares of cases in our
four case categories that have CPEs below 0.71 (the CPEs’ standard devia-
tion), 1, and 1.5. With a CPE of 0.71, even a case with an extreme X
value of 3, that is, with the highest possible “leverage,” will lose almost half
of the causal effect that it would typically have relative to the population
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mean. With a CPE of 1, it would lose two-thirds of its causal effect, and
with 1.5, the causal effect would disappear, making it difficult if not
impossible to detect the mechanism(s) underpinning it.
Under our assumptions, 12.7 percent of “high leverage” onlier cases
would lose almost half or more of their causal effect due to CPEs, 4.3 percent
would lose at least two-thirds, and 0.2 percent would lose their causal effects
entirely and typically experience a reverse effect.











Average size of CPE 0.12 0.35 0.70 1.22
Share of cases with
CPE < .71
12.7% 25.9% 50.6% 81.8%
Share of cases with CPE <1 4.3% 11.2% 28.1% 63.6%
Share of cases with
CPE < 1.5







onlier moderate outlier distinct outlier extreme outlier
Figure 2. Simulated causal process errors by attenuating outlier status.
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While we saw above that choosing onliers does not protect much against
CPEs per se, compared to attenuating outliers they provide some insurance
against large CPEs that substantially reduce or eliminate the X–Y causal
effect. In our example, few onliers are at risk of complete attenuation of
causal effects. We need to consider, however, that this results from a statis-
tical model with a quite high R2, which we moreover assume to be unbiased
and subject to no measurement errors.
If we flatten the slope of the data generation process to 2
3
x, the importance
of CPE and background error relative to the core causal process increases,
and the R2 is reduced to .25—still reasonably predictive by most social
scientific standards. Under this model, a CPE of 1 would be enough to
generate a “false negative” even for cases with extreme values on X. With a
slope of 0.47x, the model’s R2 drops to .14, and a CPE of 0.71—the
negative of the CPE’s standard deviation—is sufficient to eliminate the
causal process and produce a false negative: a case that does not evidence
a causal process which in fact is generally present in the population. As
Table 2 shows, the risk that this happens is considerable even for an onlier.
There are further reasons to believe that false negatives could be more
frequent in research practice than in the above “clean” example: In smaller
samples, there will often be no convenient onlier cases available that offers
maximum leverage, creating a trade-off between onlier status and leverage.
Model misspecification and mismeasurement further increase the risk of
false negatives, as we might pick apparent onliers that are not onliers under
a better model. We have also assumed the same standard deviation of CPEs
for all values of X, while in practice, errors could be larger for onliers with
more extreme values of X, which under simple regression models offer the
highest leverage (Seawright 2016a).
In sum, the onlier rule provides reasonable but weak guidance in identify-
ing typical cases and does not guard against false negatives if our LNA model
is weak. Substantially, one can think of many reasons for why a causal
process might not work or even produce the opposite of the expected out-
come in specific cases. In the Collier and Hoeffler model, for example,
primary commodity exports might in fact reduce the risk of conflict in a case
where revenues are judiciously used for patronage and cooptation, a mechan-
ism producing a pacifying effect. At the same time, other factors picked up
by the background error, for example, militarization of society or high levels
of organized crime, might in turn push the country toward a higher prob-
ability of war and hence back onto the regression surface, making it an onlier
that is in fact not representative of general causal processes.
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Our choice to make the CPE on average as large as the background error is
arbitrary. This article’s basic arguments cover all ranges of CPEs, however:
If we assume a smaller causal error, we are closer to a world of perfect causal
homogeneity, which, as we have seen, offers no justification at all for onlier
choices. For larger CPEs than assumed here, the onlier choice remains jus-
tified, but any observation—including onliers—will tend to be less represen-
tative, making generalization universally difficult.4 This is equivalent to
what happens when a model’s general explanatory fit is lowered as in the
above example.
There is no obvious method for identifying the relative importance of
CPEs relative to background errors in a model’s error structure. A researcher
can only speculate how sensitive a hypothesized causal mechanism could be
to idiosyncratic context factors and stochastic noise that we cannot model.
More complex, higher level mechanisms might be more susceptible to be
affected by context conditions: Macro-level processes like those linking
education to growth or natural resources to conflict are more likely to be
on the heterogeneous side. Qualitative cross-case comparisons might help
researchers acquire a better, though not conclusive, sense of a mechanism’s
dependence on idiosyncratic context.
While CPEs can always modulate case-level effect sizes, we have seen
that under some conditions, the choice of onlier case studies makes it more
likely that we will at least detect the presence and the mechanisms of a
systematic causal process—even if the observed effect size is unlikely to
be representative. But are onlier cases really the best choice if our objective is
the detection and exploration of causal processes? For this, we should look
for cases where the causal process is likely to be the most pronounced, hence
most visible. Leverage is an obvious criterion for this, but onlier status is not.
We will instead show that if we deliberately select outlier cases where the
CPE is likely to strengthen the causal process of interest, false negatives are
less likely than if we choose onliers.
Above we have looked at attenuating outliers where CPEs are likely to
reduce the force of the causal process at hand. The flipside of this finding is
that if we choose reinforcing outliers, their CPEs on average are likely to
strengthen the causal process at hand. Ceteris paribus, a stronger reinforcing
CPE should make process tracing easier due to the larger effect size.
Table 3 shows the incidence of substantial attenuating CPEs for different
types of outliers (see Online Appendix Section 2, Figure A.11, which can be
found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/, for the corresponding fig-
ure). The results are clear: Even choosing only moderate reinforcing outliers
strongly reduces the risks of CPEs that substantially weaken a causal process.
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Larger attenuating CPEs become unlikely if we choose reinforcing outlier
cases. If the aim is to avoid the risk of false negatives, it pays to choose
reinforcing outliers. In the education-growth example, this would mean
choosing a country with somewhat higher than expected growth, thereby
making it more likely that the education effect contributing to this growth
is present and visible (if, on average, somewhat stronger than in the general
case population).
Lieberman discusses the assessment we need to make when a nested case
study does not bear out a hypothesis (Lieberman 2005:448): Is it just an
idiosyncratic case subject to specific circumstances or measurement error?
Or is something wrong with the hypothesis and perhaps the LNA used to
choose the case? Any such discretionary judgment call will be open to
potential criticism. That said, idiosyncrasies that suppress causal processes
are less likely for reinforcing outliers: If we do not find a hypothesized
process there, it is unlikely to exist elsewhere. Reinforcing outliers are also
less vulnerable to measurement errors that can undermine the detection of a
causal process: If Y is overestimated, the case will just be less of a reinforcing
outlier unless the error was very large. If X was overestimated, the case just
becomes a stronger outlier (with a potentially stronger causal effect). The
same is true, conversely, about underestimated Ys and Xs. A mismeasured
onlier case, by contrast, is more likely to actually be an attenuating outlier.5
Conditions for False Positives
Choosing reinforcing outliers makes case-specific effect sizes likely to be
somewhat larger than typical. But as noted above, the purpose of case studies













Average size of CPE 0.12 0.12 0.35 0.70 1.22
Share of cases with
CPE < .71
12.7% 5.5% 1.6% 0.4% 0.0%
Share of cases with
CPE < 1
4.3% 1.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0%
Share of cases with
CPE < 1.5
0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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is seldom to make point estimates of effect sizes—and in any case, the
average absolute of CPEs in onliers barely differs between onliers and mod-
erate outliers (Table 1). If anything, a somewhat larger effect is more likely
to be visible and traceable, which is what we typically care about in small-n
work (Seawright 2016b).
In our definition, the CPE captures case-specific factors that can boost or
reduce a causal effect. If these are substantive rather than just stochastic, could
a reinforcing outlier lead to false generalizations about the nature of the causal
process at hand—a false positive? How important this problem is in research
practice depends on whether we investigate a case with preexisting hypotheses
about the X–Y causal mechanism or whether we try to identify the mechanism
(or mechanisms) inductively through the case. In the latter context, the rec-
ommendation to choose reinforcing outliers needs to be qualified:6 If proceed-
ing inductively, we might mistake unsystematic elements of the CPE for a
systematic, general causal process (Collier and Mahoney 1996). This can be
the case for both onliers and reinforcing outliers, as both are subject to CPEs.
CPEs with a positive (observable) impact on the outcome are more likely
for reinforcing outliers, however, just like attenuating CPEs are more likely
for attenuating outliers in Table 2. Processes that create reinforcing CPEs are
the ones we would be more likely to wrongly incorporate in our generalizing
conclusions about the causal mechanisms at hand. In the case of natural
resources and conflict, we might, for example, find that reliance on com-
modity rents allowed a country’s leadership to disengage from its social
constituencies, in turn increasing the likelihood of conflict—but fail to real-
ize that this process was case-specific. We might still be able to identify
causal channels linking rents and conflict that are more general, but the risk
of identifying idiosyncratic causal channels is higher for reinforcing outliers.
We should at a minimum proceed with caution in assessing whether what we
have found might “travel” to other cases.
Inductive research on causal mechanisms about a given X–Y link hence
faces a trade-off between the risks of false positives (if reinforcing outliers
are chosen) and false negatives (if onliers are chosen). This trade-off should
be explicitly evaluated on case-by-case basis. If a project will lead to follow-
up case study or LNA tests of the external validity of new findings on causal
mechanisms, a more exploratory choice of reinforcing outliers might be
advisable, as otherwise an important process might be missed. If, by contrast,
there are resources for only one case study, an onlier case choice is a con-
servative strategy that somewhat reduces the risk of false positives. This is
especially so if an X–Y link has a high ex ante likelihood of being affected by
idiosyncratic processes.
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The situation is different for case studies that test preexisting hypotheses
about a causal process: Unless these hypotheses have been generated by the
case at hand, any case will be a reasonable test of their generalizability. It is
unlikely that a preexisting hypothesis perchance only applies in one case, that
is, that we find a false positive.7 It is at the very least likely to also apply in
some other cases—although we cannot conclude that it is universal or esti-
mate its frequency, which is the domain of large-n research.
Under these circumstances of hypothesis testing, it is most appropriate to
choose reinforcing outliers as argued above, as in such cases, general causal
processes are more likely to be strong and visible. Reinforcing outliers are
also useful for falsification, as they effectively constitute “most likely”
cases—if a hypothesis does not apply there, it is less likely to apply
elsewhere.
Onliers and attenuating outliers, by contrast, run a substantial risk of
yielding a false negative in research designs that investigate existing hypoth-
eses, for reasons identified above. If a hypothesized causal process is absent
or substantially weak in such cases, we will not know whether this is due to
the case’s idiosyncrasies or because the causal process hypothesis is wrong.8
In practice, even deductive research designs can create new causal process
hypotheses, or new nuances to existing hypotheses, in the process of case
research. But if we identify such new dimensions, we should be careful about
generalizing from them, as they might constitute part of a reinforcing CPE.
As with general inductive research, such theoretical adjustments should ide-
ally be subjected to further tests on other cases or, if possible, a modified
LNA. In the context of primary resources and civil war, for example, we
might investigate a resource exporting country in which high levels of cor-
ruption in the distribution of rents have contributed to the greed and disaffec-
tion leading to war. This could lead us to add an interaction between a
corruption measure and resource exports in the LNA model.
If what we find appears intuitively plausible for a larger share of cases, the
question whether the case at hand was an onlier or not should be secondary in
deciding about LNA model revisions. If the new specification provides no
leverage in the revised LNA, this suggests that the additional nuances we
have detected were case-specific. If a revised causal process hypothesis
cannot be tested in the LNA, the best way of assessing its generalizability
is to study at least one more case for which it then becomes an ex ante
hypothesis. In this case, as per the above discussion, a reinforcing outlier
should be chosen.
The above discussion highlights the critical importance of a clear research
protocol, that is, of establishing and documenting at which stage hypotheses
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are generated and when they are tested. This is critical for deciding which
type of case to choose in nested research designs. Nonexperimental political
science still does not pay much attention to documenting research designs ex
ante (Humphreys, de la Sierra, and van der Windt 2013).
The above guidelines are quite different from standard rules of case
choice in the mixed methods literature. The one author who suggests the
deliberate choice of outliers is Seawright. He rightly, if fairly briefly, points
out the value of deviant cases for investigating causal pathways between
known X’s and Y’s, given that intervening causal processes in such cases
can be stronger and more visible (Seawright 2016a, 2016b:86). In this article,
we make the implicit distinction between CPEs and background errors under-
lying this recommendation explicit and, reinforcing the utility of outliers,
demonstrate how “typical” cases can still be unrepresentative. We add the
critical distinction between reinforcing and attenuating outliers (rather than
focusing on deviant cases in general) but also explain how the risk of false
positives demands different case choices depending on whether we investi-
gate causal processes deductively or inductively.
For the sake of exposition, the randomly generated data in the above
discussion were based on a simple bivariate regression model. The basic
logic of our arguments holds under wide range of assumptions and model
variations; see Online Appendix Section 3, which can be found at http://smr.
sagepub.com/supplemental/, for a discussion of multivariate and discrete
outcome models, models with nonlinear effects and for case studies that
investigate several independent variables at once.
Causal Process Errors and Other Case Selection
Objectives
Our interpretation of causal heterogeneity also has implications for other
purposes of case selection beyond the investigation of mechanisms. First,
if we allow for the possibility of CPEs, using case studies for estimating
general effect sizes for larger populations—a relatively unusual approach yet
one advocated in recent literature (Herron and Quinn 2016)—is a highly
unreliable enterprise.
When it comes to diagnostic case studies for identifying measurement
error on the outcome variable, unobserved (nonconfounder) variables, and
systematic causal heterogeneity, existing prescriptions to use deviant cases
(Seawright 2016a) continue to make sense. Yet we need to allow for the
possibility that deviance is just an outcome of unsystematic causal hetero-
geneity, including particularly weak or powerful versions of a general,
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already known causal mechanism. A single case study is not necessarily
dispositive in identifying any of the above factors.
To the extent that case studies are used to test for endogeneity in the shape
of reverse causality, we can use analogous rules as for the detection of
conventional causal mechanisms: A reverse mechanism linking the outcome
variable to the (assumed) causal variable will again on average be more
visible for reinforcing outliers. But as the X and Y axes are flipped in the
case of reverse causality, the cases where the mechanisms underlying reverse
causality are likely to be stronger are in fact attenuating outliers from the
perspective of the X–Y model. This requires us to simply reverse the above
selection rules. Intuitively, if we wanted to assess whether economic growth
causes education rather than the other way around, we would look at cases
where growth is combined with especially high education, making it more
likely that the effect of growth on education is visible.
Finally, if the objective is to detect omitted variables that act as confoun-
ders (i.e., are related to both the independent and dependent variable in our
model), the choice of outliers is of no particular use. Confounders are not
systematically stronger for outliers: As confounders affect both X and Y, a
strong confounder would just affect both simultaneously rather than system-
atically pushing cases off the regression surface. Researchers should instead
follow Seawright (2016a) in picking “high leverage” cases with values of the
independent variable with the strongest predicted impact. Again, we need to
be aware of the uncertainty involved in any case-specific inferences: Any
confounder process itself could be subject to CPE and can be idiosyncrati-
cally strong or weak.
A Defense of Paired Case Comparisons
So far, our discussion has looked at the investigation of individual cases,
similar to the “pathway case” approach recommended by Gerring (2007b).
How helpful is it to investigate more than one case for the process tracing of
mechanisms, as recommended by Lieberman (2005:441)? What is the impact
on the reliability of our findings under the CPE framework? It turns out that
this framework provides a new and strong justification for traditional
approaches to paired comparison (Slater and Ziblatt 2013; Tarrow 2010),
especially “method of difference”-type setups with contrasting outcomes
across cases. This is significant because the value added of such comparisons
has been in doubt ever since Lieberson’s (1991) trenchant criticism of the use
of Mill’s methods of comparison in social science.








































































































































































































































































To be sure, if we investigate two cases, causal heterogeneity means that
the probability of finding at least one false negative increases significantly
compared to a single case study (see Table 4 compared to Tables 2 and 3; for
a graphical representation of attenuating CPEs in paired comparisons, see
Figure A.12 in Online Appendix Section 2, which can be found at http://smr.
sagepub.com/supplemental/). The risk that in one of two countries under
study education has an unusual effect on growth is higher than in a single
case study.
If we are testing preexisting hypotheses, a mixed finding with one false
negative might lead us to conclude that the process at hand is likely to apply
in some cases but not others and that we are dealing with an issue of group-
level causal heterogeneity—while in fact, net of case-specific, idiosyncratic
errors, the causal process identified in the other case is general. If we arrive at
mixed findings inductively, the (wrong) suspicion that what we have found is
idiosyncratic and not generalizable will be even stronger.
The above might seem dispiriting for comparative scholars. But it applies
only if the two case studies are dealt with as separate investigations. In this
context, we expect their outcome scores to be implicitly compared to the
population mean, net of statistical controls. In a properly executed paired
comparison, however, we compare outcomes between the cases. If—as Lie-
berman suggests—cases are chosen at opposite ends of the leverage spec-
trum, the contrast between their outcomes will be larger.
In this context, we should look at the comparison as one integrated
research design. We need to consider the probability that we will find the
same or similar causal processes (or absence thereof) in two cases if they
have been chosen with contrasting leverage on the independent variable of
interest. Identifying cases this way extends Seawright’s (2016b) recommen-
dation to choose extreme values on the independent variable from the choice
of single cases to the choice of case pairs.
We consider pairs of cases chosen at opposite ends of the X spectrum in
our above bivariate simulation with random CPEs and background errors.
We investigate the combined CPEs from different, randomly drawn case
pairings with different levels of outlier status, including both attenuating and
reinforcing outliers, similar to Figure 1 and Table 1.
Table 5 indicates that the combined attenuating effect of two cases’ CPEs
very rarely is strong enough to obliterate the whole difference in causal
effects across the two cases. The linear effects of X on Y in our model range
from1.5 at one extreme toþ1.5 at the other. This means that the combined
CPEs would have to “push” the two cases closer together by three points on
the Y scale for the causal processes to evince no difference in both, which
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happens very rarely under the chosen data generation process (see Figure
A.13 in Online Appendix Section 2, which can be found at http://smr.sage
pub.com/supplemental/, for a graphical representation of combined CPEs).
The risk of a false negative becomes larger if we choose case pairs in
which the individual cases have larger, randomly chosen residuals. It grows
also if we choose case pairs whose X scores are closer to each other. A
combined CPE equivalent to two points on the Y scale, which implies a
reduction of two-thirds of the difference in X’s effect between two extreme
cases, happens in 3.5 percent of case pairs consisting of distinct outliers. In a
data generation process with a lower X gradient of 2
3
(and an R2 of .25), such a
combined CPE of 2 would be enough to completely eliminate the differ-
ence in causal effects across cases. Yet ceteris paribus, the paired case study
method appears much more reliable than the single onlier (or “pathway”)
case study investigated in Tables 2 and 3.
Choosing onliers is better than random choice of outliers. But what about
choosing outliers strategically? Similar to our strategy of choosing reinforcing
outliers in a single case study, we now choose cases whose outcomes lie
further apart than the model suggests, which typically (though not always)
are cases with residuals of opposite signs. In combining such cases, we are
even less likely to have combined CPEs that attenuate the contrast between the
two cases. Table 6 shows that the procedure does indeed result in even fewer
false negatives, particularly if we choose cases further away from the regres-
sion surface, including moderate outliers, which are barely more likely to be
atypical than onliers (see Online Appendix Section 2, Figure A.14, which can
be found at http://smr.sagepub.com/supplemental/, for a graphical representa-
tion). This selection strategy of contrasting residuals is particularly advisable if
our statistical models are weak. It means that CPEs across cases can do less
damage: One case or even both might be unusual, but the size of the (delib-
erately chosen) contrast across cases tends to more than compensate for this.
Table 5. Incidence of Combined Causal Process Errors (CPEs) of Paired Observa-
tions (All Types of Outliers).







Combined CPE < 3 0.0% 0.2% 0.3% 0.6%
Combined CPE < 2 0.5% 0.8% 3.5% 5.3%
Combined CPE < 1.5 2.1% 3.5% 10.2% 26.3%
Combined CPE < 1 9.3% 11.5% 19.9% 31.6%
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To return to the education-growth example: If we compare a case with low
educational attainment and particularly low growth outcomes with a case
with high educational attainment and particularly high growth outcomes, it is
unlikely that the difference in education levels has not contributed in at least
some way to the difference in growth across the two cases through observa-
ble mechanisms.
Qualitative methods literature argues that investigating a contrasting case
helps understand one’s core case better (Tarrow 2010:17) and that compar-
isons should capture the full variation of outcomes (Slater and Ziblatt 2013).
Our framework provides a formal justification for these intuitions.
Different from single-case nested research, in the case of comparisons, the
same essential logic applies to deductive and inductive process tracing. The
main difference is that the inferential payoff from comparisons is larger for
inductive research: Not only does the choice of contrasting outliers lower the
risk of attenuated effects and make it more likely that contrasting causal
processes will be visible. To the extent that the two cases at hand show
variations of the same process, this process is much more likely to be gen-
eralizable. This means that comparisons are particularly advisable for induc-
tive research on causal processes.
The analysis of paired case studies also helps with identifying cases for
exploratory research that serve to identify new independent variables which
could be added to an LNA model (“deviant” cases in Gerring’s terminology
and “model-building” case studies in Lieberman’s). Both Lieberman and
Gerring counsel the deliberate choice of outliers to detect new causal pro-
cesses. In case of a weak LNA, outlier status does not tell us much per se
(Rohlfing 2008). If we however choose cases with contrasting outcomes on
the dependent variable that also have contrasting residuals as outlined above,
we are more likely to detect systematic factors that drive the two apart. Such
a research design could be potentially strengthened if the cases are matched
on other measurable criteria (Nielsen 2016).
Table 6. Incidence of Combined Causal Process Errors (CPEs) of Paired Observa-
tions with Contrasting Residuals.







Combined CPE < 3 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Combined CPE < 2 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Combined CPE < 1.5 1.3% 0.9% 0.5% 0.0%
Combined CPE < 1 6.3% 2.5% 1.9% 0.0%
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The only qualification to the rule of choosing contrasting outliers obtains
if cases with a low value of the X variable at hand simply reflect the absence
of a cause, which can be the case especially with zero-bounded variables. If
our objective is to establish whether a causal process is general, including a
case in which the process can by definition not be present in our comparison
is not useful. If our aim is to research the causal processes through which
resource exports make civil war more likely, a case without resource exports
will not allow us to process trace the link between resources and conflict. It
will at best serve as broad contrast to another case with resource exports. In
such circumstances, it is advisable to choose two reinforcing outliers with the
causal factor (strongly) present.
Whether we can think of a causal factor as absent when it takes low values
is easier to decide in a deductive research design based on a specific theory of
how that factor brings about the outcome. It can be harder in inductive
research designs without hypotheses about the causal mechanism. In case
of doubt, one should err on the side of caution by choosing two reinforcing
outliers. Investigating two cases with similar values on the independent
variable instead of just one does increases the risk of at least one false
negative, but the baseline that these cases are contrasted with is the complete
absence of the independent variable. If we choose two cases with an X value
of 3 in our model, even a large attenuating CPE of 1.5 would diminish the
impact of the independent variable only by half. The choice of reinforcing
outliers further reduces the risk of false negatives (see Table 3). While we are
not able to leverage cross-case contrasts in a comparison of two reinforcing
cases, if a process is indeed found in both cases, we can be more confident in
its generality. This point is less important for deductive research designs—
where a single case study with a positive finding already carries considerable
weight—but can be critical for replicating the results from inductive inves-
tigations on a first case.9
The above discussion has important implications for single case studies
too: If a causal variable is theorized as simply absent at its lower boundary,
with no specific expectation of observable mechanisms, the visibility of
effects at the upper range of the variable in a single case is potentially larger.
This is because, as above, we are not comparing our observations to the
population mean as in our above discussion of causal variables that we
expect to have contrasting effects at both ends of their value range. We
instead implicitly compare a mechanism at the high end of the causal vari-
able’s range with its (theoretical) absence at the opposite end of the range.
How much of an advantage this simpler setup constitutes will in practice
depend on the strength of a causal process and its error structure. In any case,
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the same rules for choosing reinforcing outliers apply as for other single case
studies; see Online Appendix Section 4, which can be found at http://smr.
sagepub.com/supplemental/, for additional simulations of causal effects and
CPEs that converge toward zero at one end of the causal variable’s range.
While it might appear counterintuitive to large-n scholars, the addition of
a second, well-chosen case to a small-n research design can make empirical
inferences significantly more robust. Our discussion confirms Lieberman’s
advice to focus on at least two cases, providing a formal justification for
paired comparisons that has so far been lacking in the small-n methods
literature. Critically, our arguments apply for paired comparisons in general,
not only ones that are nested in an LNA.
Discussion: Implications for Research Practice
Imagine we build a statistical model explaining voter attitudes based on
survey data. The model is then used to identify one individual respondent
who is chosen for a case study on how and why wealth impacts citizens’
political self-identification because (a) she is very wealthy and (b) her score
on the outcome variable of left-right placement produces a small residual in
the statistical model. Further imagine that with superhuman finesse, we are
able to explain the factors that shaped her political position through a detailed
biographical investigation. Having accounted for all other systematic and
case-specific context factors in this case, we then isolate the impact that
wealth has had and the mechanisms involved. We finally conclude that
thanks to the small residual, the mechanisms identified are likely to
capture how wealth influences political positions in the voting population
in general.
This story is absurdly heroic, yet it summarizes what nested research
designs often ask us to do. We should be all the more skeptical about standard
case identification procedures in such research designs if they involve more
complex and more variegated units of analysis such as social groups, orga-
nizations, or states.10 As long as we believe that we live in a stochastic world,
any generalization from case studies—whether embedded in large-n research
designs or not—needs to be provisional and undertaken with the utmost
caution. This article provides a new conceptual framework for understanding
the roots of uncertainty in such generalizations.
Mario Small has argued that we can never reach statistical representative-
ness in small-n samples and should not aim for it. Deliberately picking
“typical” neighborhoods or households for in-depth study is misguided
(Small 2009). Instead, case should be picked on theoretical grounds and aim
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at “theoretical generalization,” that is, demonstrating patterns that are of
broader theoretical significance, without making any claims about empirical
regularities. He makes this case in the context of disciplines like social work
and sociology, where “small-n” usually means at least four and typically
dozens of cases, that is, more than in most political science nested research
designs (Creswell and Clark 2010; Small 2011).
This article is not quite as pessimistic as Small. We cannot use small-n
samples to generalize reliably about effect sizes and the frequency of specific
causal patterns in a wider class of cases. Yet, under some conditions, we can
make plausible claims that causal mechanisms identified in small-n research
also apply in other instances. This article has identified these conditions and
developed guidelines to reduce the risk of false generalizations from small-n
work nested in large-n studies.
In its analysis of nested case choice, this article has shown that the size of
causal effects is likely to fluctuate in both onlier and outlier cases. But
estimates of effect size are not the primary concern of most case study
research. Instead, in many instances, we want to establish whether a causal
process exists and investigate its nature. Table 7 gives an overview of the
rules for doing so that emerge from our discussion. Critically, our case
selection strategy should take into account our state of knowledge: If we
have existing hypotheses about the process(es) at hand, in a single case study,
it is most advisable to investigate reinforcing outliers, as this makes the
presence, strength, and visibility of a given causal process more likely,
facilitating process tracing (column 1 in Table 7). Reinforcing outliers have
a smaller risk of false negatives, while false positives in hypothesis-testing
research are unlikely.
If our objective is to inductively identify causal mechanisms linking a
given independent variable with an outcome (column 2), reinforcing outliers
make it more likely that general causal patterns are more visible. If we want
to generalize about these processes, however, reinforcing outliers also
increase the chance that the identified causal processes, or aspects thereof,
are idiosyncratic. In some cases, it will be theoretically or intuitively obvious
whether a specific process is likely to apply to a wider population, but in
others, it will not be. Choosing onlier cases for the inductive identification of
causal processes makes false positives less likely but increases the risk of
false negatives. As onliers can also be subject to causal process errors,
inductive generalization about causal mechanisms on the basis of individual
case studies is generally tenuous. Such generalizing inferences can be every
bit as problematic as using case studies to generalize about causal effects, a



























































































































































































































































































































































































































(Gerring 2004:348; Lieberman 2005:441). Inductive research about causal
processes hence faces a trade-off between false negatives and false positives.
How this is resolved will depend on the purpose and context of the project at
hand, but the trade-off should in any case be made explicit.
We have seen that increasing the number of cases under study can work as
partial corrective to case-specific errors. This is especially the case if we can
pair cases in a joint research design that maximizes the contrast in the causal
variable at hand, thereby minimizing the risk of false negatives. Ceteris
paribus, this procedure is considerably more robust than single “pathway”
case studies. It only works, however, if there are distinct observable impli-
cations for contrasting values on the independent variable (column 3).
If that is not the case—if one end of the contrast only implies absence of a
causal process—it is more advisable to choose two reinforcing outlier cases
with a strong expected impact on Y (column 4) as replication cases. If a
causal mechanism is visible in both cases, it is quite likely to also recur in
the larger universe the cases are sampled from. This is especially the case for
deductive tests of mechanisms, but it is also likely even if the mechanism is
identified inductively.11 That said, if we truly want to generalize about
frequency and strength of causal mechanisms, we have to do this through
LNA methods (Barnes and Weller 2014; Imai et al. 2011). In practice, this
will often not be possible due to lack of data, incommensurability of mea-
sures across cases and the statistical difficulty of separating a mechanism’s
immediate impact from the related independent variable’s residual impact
(Imai et al. 2011).
This article has also used its framework to refine case selection rules for
other research purposes such as identifying new causal variables, confoun-
ders, measurement error, and reverse causality. It mostly supports preexisting
selection approaches in these cases, but with a note of caution about general-
izability. It provides a new rule for selecting attenuating outliers for identify-
ing mechanisms that underlie potential reverse causality.
If this article’s arguments seem complex, then this is because the use of
large-n methods to identify appropriate case studies in a statistical context
necessarily involves complex assumptions that have not been sufficiently
analyzed to date. The argument over causal process errors is difficult to
avoid if we want to stick with formal techniques of small-n case choice. If
this article’s more differentiated recommendations for choosing cases appear
complex and contingent, then the broader conclusion that we need to be
generally more modest about our mixed methods ambitions, and about gen-
eralization from case studies more broadly, remains all the more valid.
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Case studies continue to be very important in their own right for produc-
ing internally valid accounts of what happens in individual cases, and they
arguably remain the primary tool of hypothesis generation for large-n stud-
ies. But when we want to generalize from them, we need to apply more
differentiated rules than simply choosing “on the line,” be more attentive
to substantive context as well as chance, and more tentative about the exter-
nal validity of our findings.
On the most general level, researchers using statistical methods need to
take these methods’ assumptions about how causality works seriously and, to
be consistent, carry them into their case studies. This means that case-level
causal effects are, ex ante, unknowable and mechanisms, when detected,
potentially unrepresentative. If we want to reliably generalize with small-n
methods, we need to put more focus on replication. One unexpected ray of
light in this context is that small-n comparisons—much less discussed in the
methods literature of the last 20 years than single case study selection meth-
ods—improve the chances of externally valid findings substantially in a
stochastic world. They deserve further study by methodologists, especially
those working in a mixed methods paradigm.
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Notes
1. Gerring (2007a:146) notes that cases need to be representative or “typical” in
seven of his nine case study techniques (only “influential” and “deviant” cases
are not typical).
2. Barnes and Weller (2014:61) make a similar point in a footnote but without
further elaboration. Recent “causal forest” approaches allow inferences of
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case-specific causal effects, yet these remain ultimately unprovable estimates
(Wager and Athey 2018).
3. See Schneider and Rohlfing (2013) and Rohlfing and Schneider (2018) for an
alternative mixed methods approach in which case studies are chosen on the basis
of fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis rather than regression analysis.
4. As Humphreys and Jacobs (2015:669) point out, “the gains to process tracing
diminish and then disappear as [cross-case causal] heterogeneity rises.” Ceteris
paribus, our selection rules still reduce the risk of false inferences.
5. In keeping with the mixed methods literature, we have used continuous causal
variables for the above discussion. Essentially, the same logic applies for catego-
rical causal variables like the treatments used in many experiments. While it is not
possible to maximize “leverage” through choosing particular (usually extreme)
values on such variables, choosing reinforcing outliers with stronger than predicted
outcomes will reduce the likelihood of false negatives in such contexts too.
6. See Beach and Pedersen (2013) for the important distinction of inductive and
deductive process tracing.
7. Imagine drawing a ball from an urn with 300 balls on which numbers are written.
We don’t know which numbers and also don’t know whether numbers recur more
than once. If we have no hypothesis about specific numbers, that is, work induc-
tively, and draw one ball, the number on it does not tell us anything about the
numbers on the remaining balls. If, however, we have a hypothesis that at least
some balls carry a specific number, and we draw one ball with this number, this
strongly increases our confidence that there are more balls with this number: If
the number existed only on one ball, the chance of drawing just this ball would be
a low 1 in 300 (which is not to say that drawing this one number is reason to
believe that all other balls will have the same number). A similar or weaker logic
applies if we have several hypotheses: If we expect three different numbers on the
balls and our random draw shows one of them, the chance of this happening if
that number was written on only one ball is 1 in 100.
8. In the language of Humphreys and Jacobs’s (2015) Bayesian mixed methods
framework, whether we investigate causal processes deductively or inductively,
and on or off the regression line, should help us set our priors about how much
evidentiary value we accord to process-tracing “clues” collected in a case study.
In this sense, our framework can feed into theirs.
9. See footnote 7.
10. The problematic expectation that onlier cases are “typical” might explain why
despite the high citation count of Lieberman’s (2005) article, his prescriptions are
seldom applied to the letter.
11. This is also true if we increase the n but do not find the mechanism in all cases. If
we investigate five countries out of a total sample of 200 and inductively find that
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only two share the same causal process, the probability that none of the other 195
countries does so is very low (about 2 percent); see footnote 7.
References
Achen, Christopher H. 2005. “Let’s Put Garbage-Can Regressions and Garbage-Can
Probits Where They Belong.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 22(4):
327-39.
Barnes, Jeb and Nicholas Weller. 2014. Finding Pathways: Mixed-method Research
for Studying Causal Mechanisms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Barro, Robert J. 2001. “Human Capital and Growth.” The American Economic
Review 91(2):12-17.
Beach, Derek and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. Process-tracing Methods. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Bennett, Andrew and Colin Elman. 2006. “Qualitative Research: Recent Develop-
ments in Case Study Methods.” Annual Review of Political Science 9(1):455-76.
Brady, Henry E. and David Collier. 2010. Rethinking Social Inquiry. Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield.
Collier, David and James Mahoney. 1996. “Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in
Qualitative Research.” World Politics 49(1):56-91.
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford
Economic Papers 56(4):563-95.
Creswell, John W. and Vicki L. Plano Clark. 2010. Designing and Conducting Mixed
Methods Research. 2nd ed. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science.” Pp. 79-137 in
Handbook of Political Science. Vol. 7, edited by F. I. Greenstein and N. W.
Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Elman, Colin, John Gerring, and James Mahoney. 2016. “Case Study Research:
Putting the Quant into the Qual.” Sociological Methods & Research 45(3):375-91.
Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2008. “Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Meth-
ods.” Pp. 756-76 in The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology, edited by J.
Box-Steffensmeier, H. Brady, and D. Collier. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
George, Alexander and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Develop-
ment in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Gerring, John. 2004. “What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for?” American
Political Science Review 98(02):341-54.
Gerring, John. 2007a. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Gerring, John. 2007b. “Is There a (Viable) Crucial-case Method?” Comparative
Political Studies 40(3):231-53.
34 Sociological Methods & Research XX(X)
Gerring, John and Lee Cojocaru. 2016. “Selecting Cases for Intensive Analysis: A
Diversity of Goals and Methods.” Sociological Methods & Research 45(3):
392-423.
Goertz, Gary and James Mahoney. 2012. A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and
Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Herron, Michael and Kevin Quinn. 2016. “A Careful Look at Modern Case Selection
Methods.” Sociological Methods & Research 45(3):458-92.
Holland, Paul W. 1986. “Statistics and Causal Inference.” Journal of the American
Statistical Association 81(396):945-60.
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